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Why We Need Community Control of the Police
Larry Redmond*
Police in the United States of America in the twenty-first century are out
of control. The news of a police officer killing a Black man is so common
today, it is causing many of us to become more- and-more enraged. We all
know the names Walter Scott, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Rekia
Boyd and Laquan McDonald.' These names have been plastered in newspa-
pers and flashed on computer screens from coast to coast, often with grisly
photographs or video. Each time one of these killings happens, we gnash our
teeth, wring our hands, cry, curse, demand change, demand reform, blame the
system, blame white privilege, and contemplate leaving the country.
What we fail to realize is that this phenomenon is not new. With regard to
police behavior, it is in fact the norm.
THE ORIGINS OF POLICING IN AMERICA & THE CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT
In the 1700s, watchmen in northern states and slave catchers in southern
states were the genesis of modern police departments.2 Though watchmen may
have performed their duties as a form of punishment, one of the primary func-
tions of slave catchers was to "provide a form of organized terror to deter slave
revolts."3 In the middle 1800s, the idea of centralized municipal police depart-
ments emerged in this country as a response to "disorder" as defined by the
merchant class.' It should be noted that disorder consisted of public drunken-
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free, 24-hour legal representation to people in Chicago Police Department custody. A civil rights
attorney in Chicago for over 30 years, Redmond is also an activist with the Illinois Coalition
Against Torture, the Illinois Campaign to End the New Jim Crow, and the National Alliance
Against Racial and Political Repression.
I See Chauncey Devega, Laquan McDonald is why Black Lives Matter: Race, the police, and
the chilling reality for black America, SALON, Nov. 25, 2015, http://www.salon.com/2015/11/25/
laquan-mcdonald_is.vwhy-blacklives matter race the police andthe-chillingrealityfor.
black-americal (listing Black individuals shot by the police).
2 See generally DR. GARY POTTER, THE HISTORY OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2013) (discussing the development of policing in the Great Britain and United States).
3 Id. at 3.
4 See id. ("What constitutes social and public order depends largely on who is defining
those terms, and in the cities of 19th century America?they were defined by the mercantile
1
Redmond: Why We Need Community Control of the Police
Published by LAW eCommons, 2016
No. 3 * Symposium 2015
ness and sometimes prostitution rather than crime per se.5 These mercantile
interests sought to create a stable and orderly work force and a stable and
orderly environment for the conduct of business.' They also wanted to divest
themselves of the cost of protecting their own property and transfer that cost
to the state.
After the Civil War, and because income inequality was rapidly increasing,
the economic elite began using police department personnel to break strikes
and quell protests against worker oppression." Social control became defined as
crime control by isolating "dangerous classes" as the embodiment of the crime
problem.' These "dangerous classes" consisted mainly of immigrants and free
blacks."0 The most obvious tactic used by police departments in these actions
was extreme violence." Throughout the history of policing in America, eco-
nomics and politics not crime or crime control have defined the role of the
police. 12
On January 31, 1835, the State of Illinois authorized the Town of Chicago
to establish its own police force.' 3 At that time, the first law enforcement per-
sonnel were elected, not appointed." Orsemus Morrison was elected High
Constable on August 15, 1835.1' Around 1842, the chief law enforcement
interests, who through taxes and political influence supported the development of bureaucratic
policing institutions.")
5 Id.
6 Id. at 4.
7 Id.
8 See id at 6-7 ("By the late 19th century union organizing and labor unrest was wide-
spread in the United States. New York City had 5,090 strikes, involving almost a million work-
ers from 1880 to 1900; Chicago had 1,737 strikes, involving over a half a million workers in the
same period.").
9 See id. at 4 ("This isolation of the 'dangerous classes' as the embodiment of the crime
problem created a focus in crime control that persists to today, the idea that policing should be
directed toward 'bad' individuals, rather than social and economic conditions that are crimi-
nogenic in their social outcomes.").
10 Id.
I IId. at 6.
12 Id. at 15.
13 History, CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, https://portal.chicagopolice.org/portal/page/
portal/ClearPath/About%20CPD/History (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
14 See id. ("On August 15, [1835,] Orsemus Morrison is elected Chicago's first constable
.") See also Heads of the Chicago Police Department, CHICAGOCOP.COM, http://chicagocop
.com/html/history/heads-of thecpd.html#sthash.ujDgurnaW.UW7jhcT8.dpbs (City consta-
bles and marshals elected until 1860.)
15 Heads ofthe Chicago Police Department, CHICAGOCOP.COM, http://chicagocop.com/html/
history/heads-ofthe cpd.html#sthash.ujDgumaW.dpuf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinaf-
ter Heads of Chicago Police].
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officer in Chicago became known as the City Marshal.'" Orson Smith was
elected the city's first City Marshal on March 1, 1842." From 1858 until
1861, the Mayor and the City Marshal directed police department activities.
On February 15, 1861, however, the Legislature of Illinois stripped the
city of its right to pick its own City Marshal by passing an act to establish a
Board of Police Commissioners in the City of Chicago.' 9 It was the governor
who picked the board members, and it was the duty of the board to organize
the police force by appointing a superintendent, deputy superintendent and all
subordinate personnel. 2 0 The board appointed General Superintendent Cyrus
P. Bradley on May 1, 1 8 6 1 .21 Though there have been organizational changes
over the years - home rule being principal among them - the Chicago Police
Board participates in the selection of a police superintendent to this day.
RECENT CAMPAIGNS FOR CIVILIAN POLICE OVERSIGHT
Over the years, various attempts, including commissions, have been made
to control the abuses perpetrated by the police.2 2 However, none of them have
worked. Commissions inform the public, but they have little lasting impact on
police practices.2 3
In Detroit, Michigan, Mayor Coleman Young had limited success in 1973
when he disbanded the Stop The Robberies Enjoy Safe Streets (STRESS) unit,
notorious for its violent treatment of Blacks. 2 4 He also further integrated the
Detroit Police Department from 10% to 50% Black enrollment by 1993.25
However, police abuses continued. As a result on October 22, 1996, some
16 See id. (City Marshall Olson Smith was elected on March 1, 1842.)
17 Heads of Chicago Police, supra note 15.
18 Chicago Police Department, CHICAGOLOGY, https://chicagology.com/chicagopolice/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2016).
19 Id.
20 Id
21 Heads of Chicago Police, supra note 15.
22 See generally POTTER, supra note 3, at 9-15 (discussing and analyzing the various methods
used in attempt to address police violence).
23 Id. at 10.
24 See George Hunter, Detroit police diversity issues predate national debate, THE DETROIT
NEWS, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2015/03/07/
detroit-police-department-diversity/24570427/ (stating that the STRESS unit and Big Four
units "[b]oth randomly stopped and harassed black citizens, and experts say the units fueled
much of the racial tension during the 1960s and 1970s.").
25 Coleman A. Young, 79, Mayor of Detroit And Political Symbol for Blacks, Is Dead, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/01/us/coleman-a-young-
79-mayor-of-detroit-and-political-symbol-for-blacks-is-dead.html/.
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Detroit activists founded the Detroit Coalition Against Police Brutality. The
Coalition's mission is to "mobilize a powerful, visible local, national and inter-
national protest against brutality and institutional violence." 2 6
In New Orleans, Louisiana, in 2002, a Police-Civilian Review Task Force
recommended the creation of the Office of the New Orleans Independent Po-
lice Monitor (OIPM). 27 In 2009, that office was created.28 Since its creation,
the OIPM has come under heavy attack, because it investigates the same use-
of-force incidents that are investigated by the New Orleans Police Depart-
ment's Public Integrity Bureau (PIB). 2 9 The PIB has complained that the
OIPM has "unfettered access" to each case.30 The OIPM countered that to not
have that kind of access is problematic. 3' Without the permission of the In-
spector General, the OIPM released a privately recorded video of New Orleans
Police -Department Officer Joshua Colclough fatally shooting unarmed 20-
year-old Wendell Allen.3 2 As a result, the officer later pled guilty to manslaugh-
ter and is serving a four-year prison term.3 3 Because of this incident and cer-
tain other issues, the Inspector General now wants the IPM fired.3 Police
unions, internal affairs units, and citizens who are law-and-order advocates
often oppose civilian oversight of law enforcement.3 5 Apparently, so does the
Inspector General.
Citizens in Berkeley, California began campaigning for community con-
trol of the police in the 1970s. 6 A referendum calling for community control
26 About, DETROIT COALITION AGAINST POLICE BRUTALITY, http://detroitcoalition.org/
about/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
27 History, OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POuCE MONITOR, http://nolaipm.org/main/in
side.php?page=history (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).
28 Id.
29 Jonathan Bullington, Independent Police Monitor's report questions use of force investigations
by NOPD, THE TIMEs-PICAYUNE, Apr. 23, 2015, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/
04/independent-police monitors re.html.
3 0 Id.
31 Id.
32 Brentin Mock, When Independent Police Oversight Becomes Too Independent, CITYLAB,
Sept. 30, 2015, http://www.citylab.com/design/2015/09/when-independent-police-oversight-be
comes-too-independent/407290/.
3 Id.
34 Id.
35 Nadra Enzi, New Orleans Independent Police Monitor Solution, WESTERN JOURNALISM,
Feb. 16, 2013, http://www.westernjournalism.com/new-orleans-independent-police-monitor-sol
ution/.
36 DAVID MONDSTOCK, Chapter 2: The 1971 Election and the April Coalition, BERKELEY IN
THE 70s: A HISTORY OF PROGRESSIVE ELECTORAL POLITIcs (unpublished), available at http://
berkeleyinthe70s.homestead.coml/files/d-1971 .htm.
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of police was on the ballot for the April 6, 1971 election." In fact, that refer-
endum called for the creation of three separate Berkeley police departments
run by elected boards: one for the hills' neighborhood, one for the campus
community, and one for the Black community.3 1 It was defeated 68% to
32%.'9 However, two years later, in 1973, four separate referenda were on the
ballot, representing four separate watered-down portions of the initiative for
community control of police.40 The four referenda were (1) a Police Review
Commission, (2) Police Weapons Control, (3) a Police Residence Require-
ment, and (4) a Mutual Aid Pact Regulation. 4 Of the four, two passed: the
Police Review Commission and the Mutual Aid Pact Regulation.42 The City of
Berkeley Police Review Commission exists to this day,43 addressing complaints
against Berkeley police officers.
Minneapolis, Minnesota, presents a cautionary tale. In April 2012, the
State of Minnesota, at the urging of the Minneapolis Police Federation, that
city's police union, passed a law that seriously undercut the power of a 22-year-
old system of civilian police oversight.4 4 The new law prohibited the Minneap-
olis Civilian Review Authority (CRA) - the body responsible for overseeing the
Minneapolis Police Department - from issuing "findings of fact." 4 5 As it turns
out, these findings were being "routinely ignored" anyway46 because the CRA
had no authority to enforce its recommendations. Five months later, on Sep-
tember 21, 2012, the Minneapolis City Council passed an ordinance creating
the Police Conduct Oversight Commission. 47 The new law scrapped the old
37 Id.
3 8 Id.
3 9 Id.
40 DAVID MONDSTOCK, Chapter 3 - The 1971 to 1973 City Council and the April 1973
Election, BERKELEY IN THE 7Os: A HISTORY OF PROGRESSIVE ELECTORAL POLITICS, (unpub-
lished), available at http://berkeleyinthe70s.homestead.com/files/e-71to73.htm.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Home, CrrY OF BERKELEY POLICE REVIEW COMM'N, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/prc/
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
44 Randy Furst, New law throws Minneapolis police oversight in turmoil, STAR TRIB. (Apr. 6,
2012, 9:22 PM), http://www.startribune.com/new-law-throws-minneapolis-police-oversight-in-
turmoil/ 146497655/.
45 Id.
46 Matt McKinney, Minneapolis Police Conduct Oversight Commission to meet for first time,
THE STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 5, 2013, , http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-police-conduct-
oversight-conmmission-to-meet-for-first-time/22660235 1 /.
47 Andy Mannix, Mpls City Council passes Civilian Review Authority overhaul 8-5, CrrY
PAGES, Sept. 21, 2012, , http://www.citypages.com/news/mps-city-council-passes-civiian-re
view-authority-overhaul-8-5-656761 1.
2301
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model, in which police misconduct complaints were reviewed by a board com-
posed entirely of appointed citizens, and replaced it with an entirely new, first-
of-its-kind process that combined police and citizens in the review process.
This was clearly a step backwards. Police unions do not want police accounta-
bility.49 With police officers now part of the oversight process, accountability is
now hard to come by. As of August 29, 2013, 439 cases of police misconduct
have been brought before the Police Conduct Oversight Commission, and not
one police officer who has faced a complaint has been disciplined.50 If the
CRA had the power to enforce its recommendations, the new Police Conduct
Oversight Commission might never have been needed.
POLICE OVERSIGHT IN CHICAGO
Recent attempts at police oversight in Chicago, Illinois have been check-
ered. Since 1974, the year the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) was
formed, OPS has consistently failed to adequately address the issue of brutal or
corrupt officers. 5 ' Most critical observers of OPS have concluded that OPS
obscured and downplayed police misconduct rather than investigating and un-
covering it.52 From 1999 through 2004, the percentage of cases sustained by
OPS ranged from 0.41% to 1.45%.5
The nine-member, mayor-appointed police board establishes the protocols
by which the Chicago Police Department (CPD) is run. Only the police board
has the power to fire an officer. However, the police board routinely exonerates
officers accused of serious violations, or reduces their recommended
penalties.5 4
48 Id.
49 Enzi, supra note 35.
50 Katie Rucke, Claims ofMinneapolis Police Misconduct: 439; Officers Disciplined: 0, MINT-
PRESS NEWS, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.mintpressnews.com/minneapolis-police-misconduct/
167997/.
51 See Chicago: Office ofProfessional Standards, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.colum-
bia.edulitc/journalism/cases/katrina/Human%20Rights%20Watch/uspohtml/uspo55.htm
("Many community activists and attorneys who represent victims of police abuse in civil
suits. . .. claim that the OPS staff is often rude to complainants, conducts sloppy investigations,
and places an enormous burden on complainants to prove their cases. . ..There is a perception
among community activists that the OPS is biased in favor of the police generally and is particu-
larly vulnerable to pressure by the police union. The code of silence among officers is strong
during OPS reviews, as officers routinely claim no knowledge of alleged excessive force.").
52 Tracy Siska& Joseph Lipari, An Open Letter to Mayor Daley, CHI. JUSTICE PROJECT, http:/
/www.chicagojustice.org/blog/an-open-letter-to-mayor-daley.
5 3 Id.
54 See Chicago: Office of Professional Standards, supra note 51.
231
6
Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 6
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol21/iss3/6
Loyola Public Interest Law Reporter
The Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), created in 2007 by the
Chicago City Council to replace OPS, has fared poorly.55After examining
more than 400 shootings since being established, IPRA has faulted officers in
only two cases. In fact, since 1986, a period spanning both OPS and IPRA,
more than 1,600 people have been shot by Chicago police officers-an average
of more than one person a week.5 Over the last two years, in 208 closed
cases-a period in which IPRA was exclusively under Scott Ando's control-
no shooting has been deemed unjustified.58 On December 6, 2015, after the
announcement of an investigation of the Chicago Police Department by the
U.S. Department of Justice, Scott Ando resigned.5 9 The investigation by the
DOJ was prompted by the suppression of a video showing the murder of La-
quan McDonald by CPD officer Jason Van Dyke.6 0 Mayor Emanuel, who
originally appointed Ando to that post, said that "new leadership is required as
we rededicate ourselves to dramatically improving our system of police ac-
countability and rebuilding trust in that process." 6 1 Pretty words.
THE CIVILIAN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY COUNCIL
The history of police oversight in this country is clear. The current system
of police oversight is not working for the benefit of the people. It is working
for the benefit of the economic elite. It is time for a paradigm change. It is
time to put control of the police in the hands of the people.
Founded in 1973 as a local branch of the National Alliance Against Racist
and Political Repression (NAARPR), the Chicago chapter grew out of and
helped promote the mass movement to free Angela Davis and all political pris-
55 Mitch Smith, Outside Panel to Examine Police Shootings in Chicago, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/24/us/outside-panel-to-examine-pol
ice-shootings-in-chicago.html?_r= 1.
5 6 Id.
57 Steve Bogira, When Chicago cops shoot, CHICAGO READER, May 20, 2015, http://www
.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicago-police-department-shooting-kevin-fry-cops-cedrick-chat-
man/Content?oid= 17767928.
58 Id
59 Head of Chicago's Independent Police Review Authority Resigns, NBC CHICAGO, Dec. 6,
2015, http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Head-of-Chicagos-Independent-Police-Review-
Authority-Resigns-36074283 1.html#ixzz44IPdErhN.
60 Jon Seidel, Police review authority boss ousted, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs, Dec. 6, 2015, http://
chicago.suntimes.com/politics/police-review-authority-boss-ousted/.
61 Id.
232
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oners.62 Today, the Alliance is championing community control of the Chi-
cago Police Department by way of a proposed ordinance for an all-elected
Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC). 6 3 This initiative began in
2012 with the drafting of the ordinance.6 ' Early in the process, there were two
people's hearings on police crimes in support of the ordinance. 5 One was in
July, 2012, and the other was in February, 2013.66 On August 28, 2013, there
was a rally at Chicago's City Hall that was attended by 500 people to demand
passage of the ordinance. Two years later, on August 29, 2015, another
march and rally took place,6 1 which began at the Federal Plaza and wound its
way to City Hall. Over 3,000 people marched.6 9
The Civilian Police Accountability Council would replace both IPRA and
the Police Board, and would be composed of 22 members, one elected from
each of the 22 police districts in the city.7 0 Each candidate would be required
to live in the district for one year prior to seeking the office, and if elected,
would be required to remain in the district for the balance of his time in
office.7 1 Among other powers and duties, the Council would select the police
superintendent, write the protocols of engagement including use of force, in-
vestigate and determine the action to be taken for all police crimes and mis-
conduct, negotiate with the police union and manage the budget of the
Chicago Police Department. 72 The Council would have subpoena power and
the power to fire an officer and solicit the convening of a federal grand jury for
an indictment, if necessary.73
62 CHICAGO ALLIANCE AGAINST RAcIsT & POLITICAL REPRESSION (CAARPR), http://
naarpr.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
63 About the Stop Police Crimes Campaign, THE CHICAGO ALLIANCE AGAINST RACIST AND
POurICAL REPRESSION (CAARPR), Sept. 15, 2013, http://naarpr.org/stop-police-crimes/.
64 Id.
6 5 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 "This Stops Today! - We Cant Breathe"August 29 2015 Mass March for CPA C, CHICAGO
ALLIANCE AGAINST RACIST & PoLiIcAL REPRESSION (CAARPR), http://naarpr.org/this-stops-
today-we-cant-breathe-august-29-2015-mass-march-for-cpac/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
69 Stop Police Crimes Home, CHI. ALLIANCE AG. RACIST & POLITICAL REPRESSION
(CAARPR), http://naarpr.org/join-ca-mpaign-police-accountability/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
70 CIVILIAN POLICE ACCOUNTABIITY CoUNcEL, MUN. CODE OF CHI. § 2-83-020 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 2015) http://naarpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Council-Ready-Pro-
posed-Legislation.pdf.
71 Id. § 2-83-030.
72 Id§ 2-83-040.
73 Id.
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CONCLUSION
It has been amply demonstrated that oversight bodies and commissions
have no effect on the behavior of police departments and officers." It is time
for that to change. It is time for control of the police to be placed directly back
in the hands of the people, the way it was back in 1835. It is time for an all-
elected Civilian Police Accountability Council.
Power to the people!
74 See Potter, supra note 2, at 14 ("Community policing is the latest iteration in efforts to (1)
improve relations between the police and the community; (2) decentralize the police; and, (3) in
response to the overwhelming body of scholarly literature which finds that the police have virtu-
ally no impact on crime, no matter their emphasis or role, provide a means to make citizens feel
more comfortable about what has been a seemingly insolu[ ]ble American dilemma.").
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